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INTRODUCTION
For most people, the prototypical criminal offense involves an action that is clearly and unambiguously morally blameworthy, such as
an unjustified act of violence or taking of property. Yet many crimes,
especially so-called white collar crimes, exist in a realm of substantially greater ambiguity. In a previous article, we examined lay intuitions
toward a series of white collar offenses—fraud, perjury and false
statements, and bribery and gratuities—in an effort to determine how
lay people distinguish between criminal fraud and “sharp dealing,”
bribery and “horse trading,” perjury and “wiliness on the witness
stand,” and the like.1 In this study, we examine lay views of insider
trading.
Our system of securities law prohibits investors from buying or selling stock on the basis of “non-public” information unless such information is first disclosed. Those who engage in insider trading can be
prosecuted criminally or subjected to substantial civil sanctions.2 Yet,
as in the case of the other white collar offenses we have studied, the
line between illegal insider trading and mere “savvy investing” can
seem elusive. Some even argue that insider trading should not be
prohibited at all.3 Even among those who agree that certain “core”
cases of insider trading should be illegal, there is likely to be confusion about exactly how to deal with outlying cases and about what
factors should distinguish violations that are criminal from those that
are civil.
We wanted to know what the general public thinks about various
acts of insider trading and related activity. If ordinary people agree
with those who advocate for the abolition of insider trading laws, then
1. Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar
Crime Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forth-

coming 2012) (manuscript at 1) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Green & Kugler,
Public Perceptions].
2. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff, 78u-1 (2010).
3. See, e.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)
(most famously).
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those who attempt to enforce such laws will operate at a considerable
disadvantage. Offenders will generally not be tarred with moral approbation and potential jurors will wonder whether the pursuit of these actors is worth public resources. If, as we believe is more likely,
people do tend to support a prohibition on at least some forms of insider trading, then the limits and priorities they endorse should be of
interest to policymakers. As we will explain in Part II, there is reason
to believe that it is important for the criminal law to maintain a connection to the moral intuitions of the lay public and, when the law
must differ from that intuition, for it to do so deliberately and coherently.
We begin by outlining in broad terms the scope of insider trading
law. We then explain why it is important to consider how the views of
the lay public contrast with legal practice. We present a brief discussion of the psychological literature on procedural fairness, which is
relevant to understanding lay views on insider trading. Finally, we
describe three linked empirical studies that examine lay views of insider trading from several different perspectives.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON INSIDER TRADING
Our system of securities law forbids investors from buying or selling stock on the basis of “non-public” information, at least in certain
circumstances.4 Yet the most successful and celebrated investors are
precisely those who have the best access to (and the best ability to interpret) information that is generally unavailable to the casual investor, even if it is not, strictly speaking, “non-public. This dichotomy
presents something of a puzzle: where does one draw the line between illegal insider trading and mere savvy investing?
For many years, courts and commentators have struggled to define
the proper limits of insider trading.5 Much of the confusion rests on a
lack of clarity about exactly what harms, if any, insider trading causes
and who, if anyone, it wrongs. Some commentators have gone so far
as to argue that insider trading should be no crime at all.6 Others
have sought to limit the scope of its coverage in a variety of ways.
One problem is that no statute or rule specifically prohibits insider
4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2011).
5. For academic commentary on this topic, see Richard L. Lippke, Justice and
Insider Trading, 10 J. APPLIED PHIL. 215 (1993); Jennifer Moore, What is Really Unethical About Insider Trading?, 9 J. BUS. ETHICS 171 (1990); Alan Strudler & Eric W.
Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999).
6. MANNE, supra note 3.
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trading. Rather, the offense has developed mainly through a body of
judicial interpretations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5,
which bar “manipulative or deceptive devices” in connection with securities transactions.7
There have been several different and sometimes overlapping theories of what conduct should constitute insider trading. In its broadest form, insider trading law was viewed as prohibiting essentially all
trading by those who had access to non-publicly available information, regardless of how those individuals obtained that information. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and several
lower courts—in early cases such as Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. and In re Cady, Roberts & Co.—
justified such a rule primarily on the basis of the supposed unfairness
of unequal access to such information.8
The scope of insider trading law under modern case law, however,
has been more limited. It focuses less on whether the trader had an
unfair informational advantage and more on how he came to have
such an advantage in the first place.9 Thus, under the so-called “classical” or “traditional” theory of insider trading, trading on material,
non-public information is illegal only if the trader is a corporate insider. A corporate insider may be a permanent insider, such as an officer or director, or a temporary insider, such as a lawyer or consultant. The rationale is that by trading on information unavailable to
the public, an insider violates his duty to corporate shareholders.10
For example, in Chiarella v. United States, the defendant, an employee at a financial printer responsible for printing deal announcements,
deduced the identities of takeover targets and, on the basis of that information, purchased shares before the public announcement led to
an increase in the shares’ value.11 In overturning the defendant’s
conviction in the trial court, the Supreme Court rejected the view that
7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2011).
8. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 83925, 1961 WL 59902 (Nov. 8, 1961).
9. Cf. Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 562-63
(2011) ("Insider trading law aims at a sometimes difficult-to-specify category of unfair, inefficient, or otherwise-undesirable informational advantage. It is good when a
trader does research to gain an advantage. It is bad when a corporate insider gains an
advantage simply from having seen a document or having sat in a meeting from
which she learned about a deal before the public did.")
10. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
11. 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
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merely possessing non-public information made his trading illegal.12
The Court reasoned that for a trade to constitute insider trading, the
trader must owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s stockholders or
derivatively assume the duty of the person who gave him the inside
information (the “tipper”).13 The mere fact that a trader holds an advantage, and that a trade is in some sense “unfair,” does not make it
fraudulent under the securities laws.14
Under the complementary “misappropriation theory” of insider
trading, a defendant is liable for violating a pre-existing duty to the
source of the inside information on which he traded. For example, in
United States v. Carpenter, the defendant, R. Foster Winans, a columnist for the Wall Street Journal, was charged with operating a
scheme through which he would trade in stocks that were to be the
subject of his forthcoming “Heard on the Street” columns.15 The Second Circuit held that although Winans owed no duty to the shareholders of the companies in whose stock he had traded (and therefore
had not committed insider trading under the classical theory), he did
owe a duty to the source of the information, his employer, the Journal.16 Therefore, he had committed insider trading under the misappropriation theory.17
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. O’Hagan is similar. There, the defendant was charged with trading on the basis of
non-public information obtained from his law firm, which represented
a client contemplating a tender offer for shares of the Pillsbury Company.18 Because Pillsbury was not a client of his firm, the defendant
was not liable under the classical theory; he had no duty to Pillsbury’s
shareholders. Instead, the Court held that O’Hagan could be held liable under the misappropriation theory of insider trading for breaching a duty to the source of the information (namely, his firm and its
client).19

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 235.
See id. at 228–229, 230 n.12.
See id. at 232.

791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).

See id. at 1034.
Id.

521 U.S. 642, 648 (1997).

See id. at 650, 652, 659.
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II. WHY CITIZENS’ INTUITIONS A BOUT MORAL
BLAMEWORTHINESS MATTER
The law of insider trading, like much white collar criminal law,
makes fine distinctions between conduct that appears to be merely
“aggressive business behavior” and conduct that is illegal and potentially criminal.20 We wanted to know whether similar distinctions
would appear in lay subjects’ judgments about such conduct.
Citizens’ beliefs about the seriousness of various criminal acts matter for a number of reasons.21 Most scholars agree that society’s ability to enforce compliance with the law lies less in the power to impose
sanctions than it does in its ability to influence the way people live
their daily lives. Generally, people refrain from committing crimes
not because they fear sanctions, but because they believe the underly22
ing conduct is morally wrong. Thus, law deters by informing citizens
that society has decided a certain act is wrong and by persuading
them to adopt that view. If the law does not reflect or create a moral
aversion among the citizenry, then its deterrent power is substantially
lessened. As Paul Robinson and John Darley put it:
The criminal justice system’s power to stigmatize depends on the legal codes having moral credibility in the community. The law needs
to have earned a reputation for accurately representing what violations do and do not deserve moral condemnation from the community’s point of view. This reputation will be undercut if liability and
punishment rules deviate from a community’s shared intuitions of
justice.23

When the criminal law is viewed as a reliable indicator of what the
community regards as wrongful, citizens are more likely to follow its
lead in cases that are unclear. When criminal codes deviate from the

20. See Green & Kugler, Public Perceptions, supra note 1.
21. The discussion in this Section is derived from Stuart P. Green & Matthew B.
Kugler, Community Perceptions of Theft Seriousness: A Challenge to Model Penal
Code and English Theft Act Consolidation, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2010).
22. See, e.g., TOM R.TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1992).
23. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice]; see also PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1995); John M. Darley, et al., Community Standards for Defining Attempt: Inconsistencies with the Model Penal Code, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 405, 419 (1996);
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1136 (1998).
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norms of the community, citizens may be less likely to cooperate with
or acquiesce in the system’s demands.24
Maintaining consistency between the law and social norms is important not only in connection with deciding which conduct should or
should not be criminalized, but also in deciding how much to punish
for that conduct. If the legal system imposes more or less punishment
for certain crimes than citizens believe is deserved, the system seems
unfair. It loses its credibility and, ultimately, its effectiveness.
These considerations play out in an especially interesting way when
applied to white collar criminal behavior. In contrast to prototypical
street crimes for which the primary questions are how wrong an act is
and what factors may mitigate the wrongfulness, white collar crimes
often raise the issue of whether an act is wrong at all. When it is not
intuitive that certain criminalized conduct is wrong, the potential for
discord between community attitudes and legal policy increases substantially, as does the potential for a loss of credibility if the law strays
from community norms. Also at stake is what Andrew Ashworth has
called the principle of “fair labeling”—the idea that “widely felt distinctions between kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are
respected and signaled by the law, and that offences are subdivided
and labeled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the
law-breaking.”25 If the public endorses a prohibition on insider trading in general, but balks at its application to a particular kind of case,
then that, too, would raise issues of legitimacy.
We are not arguing that the criminal law should always follow popular
opinion, or that people’s moral intuitions are necessarily correct or immune
from persuasion. Moreover, we recognize that present attitudes toward insider trading are likely shaped by the fact that it has been criminalized for
the last several generations. In formulating an effective and authoritative
criminal law, however, it is essential to know what people’s intuitions are
and where they diverge from current or proposed legal rules. If the public
disagrees with a legal practice despite having been exposed to it for many
years, that is of particular note because it implies that there is a limit to the
flexibility of popular attitudes on that issue.

24. See Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral
Mandate Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1239,
1240 (2008); Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 23, at 23; William
Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2000).
25. James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labeling in Criminal Law, 71 MOD.
L. REV. 217, 219 (2008) (quoting ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES
LAW 88 (4th ed. 2003)).

OF

CRIMINAL
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III. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES
REGARDING INSIDER TRADING
The earlier literature on community attitudes towards insider trading is quite limited. Meir Statman administered surveys to university
students and finance professionals in eight countries: Australia, India,
Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States.
Subjects read vignettes and were asked to rate the “fairness” of the
conduct described there.26 One scenario involved a lawyer at a firm
who received confidential information about a client company’s plan
to acquire another company. This lawyer traded stock in the aboutto-be-acquired (non-client) company on the basis of that confidential
information. A second scenario involved a person who overheard a
conversation in which top executives at a well-known firm were discussing the company’s surprisingly good sales results and bought
stock in the company on the basis of that presumably confidential information. A third scenario involved a trade by a person who relied
on his “research and skill” (rather than inside information) in deciding to sell stock.27
Statman found a significant difference in the way the first two scenarios were perceived in different countries and by the two separate
groups of subjects (students and finance professionals). For example,
in the first scenario, only 5% of finance professionals in the United
States and the Netherlands judged the lawyer’s conduct acceptable,
followed by Australia and Israel, where 16% of finance professionals
judged his behavior acceptable. In Tunisia, Italy, India, and Turkey, a
much higher percentage of respondents deemed the lawyer’s conduct
acceptable (41%, 43%, 49%, and 56%, respectively).28 Among students, a higher percentage tended to view the lawyer’s conduct as acceptable, with a similar distribution generally observable across countries. For example, 36% of students in the U.S. found the lawyer’s
conduct acceptable, compared with 76% in India.29 In the case of the
person who overheard the conversation about sales figures, a much
higher percentage of subjects viewed his conduct as acceptable, although here the two groups of subjects were flipped: 72% of the financial professionals in the U.S. said his behavior was acceptable, while
only 57% of the students said it was acceptable. Similar patterns ap26. See Meir Statman, Is it Fair? Perceptions of Fair Investment Behavior across
Countries, 12 J. INV. CONSULTING 45, 48 (2011).
27. See id. at 48–49.
28. See id. at 48.
29. See id.
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peared in the other countries. 30 As for the case of the investor who
relied merely on skill and knowledge, an extremely high percentage
of both students and professionals in all countries viewed his conduct
as acceptable.31
Statman attributed the difference between the views of financial
professionals and university students to differences in their level of
familiarity with the law of insider trading. Financial professionals,
who were likely more familiar with the law, were more likely to think
insider trading behavior was unfair.32 Statman linked differences
among subjects in different countries to diverging attitudes about corruption. Subjects from countries with a lower tolerance for corruption, as measured by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index,33 were more likely to view insider trading as unfair.34
We think the Statman study offers useful insights into the way the
public views some core types of insider trading. From our perspective, however, the study reflects several significant limitations. It did
not go beyond core cases of insider trading, into the realm where
some of the most interesting moral ambiguities and most perplexing
legal issues lie. For example, the study did not ask subjects whether
the conduct should be treated as a crime or subject to civil sanctions,
nor did it ask about the difference between tipper and tippee liability.
It also did not vary the amount of money earned in the trade, and did
not distinguish between merely “possessing” and actually “using”
confidential information. Although we agree that the concept of unfairness likely plays a significant role in why people view insider trading as blameworthy, we do not think that unfairness exhausts the
moral content of insider trading. We think there are other plausible
explanations for why insider trading is viewed as wrong, reflected in
both the case law and academic literature that need to be considered
as well—most especially, breach of duty to the source of the confidential information
IV. POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL R OOTS OF OPPOSITION TO
INSIDER TRADING
As noted above, early insider trading doctrine (in cases like Cady,
Roberts & Co., and Texas Gulf Sulphur) tended to focus on the idea
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 49.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 53 tbl. 6.
See id. at 53.
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that a trader who relied on confidential information was benefiting
from an “unfair” advantage not held by other traders.35 More modern
doctrine, by contrast, has focused on the trader’s breach of duty to the
source of the information he used.
There is a great deal of important psychological work on how people perceive and respond to unfairness. This literature may shed
some light on the motivations underlying prohibitions on insider trading. First, people are reluctant to “buy in” to a system that they do
not perceive as fair or governed by neutral procedures. For example,
Tom Tyler’s work on procedural justice has demonstrated that people
are more likely to accept and abide by a decision that was reached using fair procedures, even if the decision goes against their interests.36
Specifically in the legal context, this kind of procedural fairness has
been shown to matter in a host of real world, high-consequence domains. The satisfaction of civil litigants depends heavily not only on
the results of their cases, but also on their perceptions of procedural
fairness.37 Similarly, defendants in felony cases perceived the verdicts
they received as more legitimate if they thought the procedures used
during the trial were fair, independent of whether they were acquitted.38 People who believe that the police employ fair and impartial
procedures are more likely to cooperate with law enforcement.39
People are also hostile toward those they perceive as taking unfair
advantage of a situation, sometimes even to the point of being willing
to accept pain to punish them. Consider the example of the ultimatum game. Two players divide a fixed sum of money (often $10 or
$20). Player 1 proposes a division and Player 2 must either accept the
division, causing it to take immediate effect, or reject the division,
causing both players to lose access to the money. No communication
is allowed. The game creates a tension within Player 2 between the
strictly rational response, to accept any non-zero offer, and the desire
to insist on fair treatment. Behavioral data, gathered across decades
35. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
36. See Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 (1988).
37. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 81–85 (1975).
38. See Johnathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 483, 503 (1988).
39. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 535
(2003); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do
Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?,
19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 234 (2001).
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by more researchers than can be mentioned, suggests that the fairness
motive dominates; players will generally reject any offer that leaves
them with less than 30% of the overall pie.40 Though this outcome
may seem trivial when people are rejecting $3 to $4, the same pattern
has been observed in cases where larger amounts of money were at
stake.41 Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues have documented a
number of additional fairness constraints on economically rational
behavior. For instance, not only are people resistant to being treated
unfairly, but they will also sacrifice personal gain to avoid benefiting a
person who has previously treated a completely unrelated third party
badly in a previous ultimatum game.42 People also respond negatively
to employers who reduce wages in response to a weak labor market,
and to stores that raise prices on snow equipment right after a storm;
they apparently see it as unfair to take advantage of the changing
power dynamic.43
Taking seriously these two sets of findings, we begin to see the
genesis of the unfairness rationale for prohibitions on insider trading.
For the stock market to work as intended, people must be willing to
“buy in,” and, as we know from the procedural justice literature, this
willingness can be expected to be contingent on an assurance of fair
play. We therefore think it is no accident that Statman found that the
countries with the best developed financial sectors also had populaces
that strongly supported insider trading laws. Widespread public participation may require this assurance of facial neutrality. Given the
inclination to punish those who violate fairness norms, we can also
see the impetus for assigning moral condemnation to those who break
such rules once the rules are established.
Although there is no corresponding literature on psychological responses to breaches of obligation, there are a number of studies examining people’s willingness to cheat or cause harm. One factor that
plays a substantial role in this area is the directness of the act. Psychologists have shown, across a variety of domains and contexts, that
people tend to perceive objects, events, and other people that are far

40. See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies, Ultimatums, Dictators
and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 210 (1995).
41. See Lisa Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental
Evidence from Indonesia, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 47, 58 (1999).
42. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59
J. BUS. S285, S291 (1986).
43. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 734 (1986).
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away in different ways than those that are close up.44 Nina Mazar, On
Amir, and Dan Ariely recently demonstrated this phenomenon in a
series of studies in the context of dishonesty.45 In these studies, the
researchers asked their subjects to complete a series of basic math
puzzles within a time limit, and they paid the subjects based on the
number of problems they solved. Through various means, the participants had the opportunity to cheat, say they had completed more
puzzles than was actually the case, and therefore receive greater compensation.46 Across all studies, the researchers observed a constant
but fairly low level of cheating; those who could cheat tended to get
one to two more questions right than those who could not.47 Interesting for our purposes was a study that manipulated the mechanism
through which participants received compensation. In one version,
participants reported the number of questions they answered correctly directly to the person who would pay them. In another version,
participants reported the correct number to a separate person who
paid them in tokens that participants took across the room to exchange for cash. Though the conditions were morally indistinguishable, cheating was substantially more common in the condition in
which tokens were used as an intermediary between the cheating and
the unearned gains.48
A further demonstration of the power of indirect action comes
from the domain of moral psychology. A line of research conducted
by Adam Moore and his colleagues has shed new light on the class of
moral reasoning dilemmas that the classic Trolley Problem exemplifies.49 The classic case involves a runaway trolley heading down a
track on which five men are working obliviously. The actor has the
option of flipping a switch, causing the trolley to instead go down a
track that contains only a single workman. The question for the
reader is whether it would be morally acceptable for the actor to flip
44. See generally Yacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110
PSYCHOL. REV. 403 (2003).
45. See Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of SelfConcept Maintenance, 44 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008).
46. See id. at 635.
47. See id. at 641.
48. See id. at 637–38.
49. See generally Adam B. Moore et al., In Defense of the Personal/Impersonal

Distinction in Moral Psychology Research: Cross-Cultural Validation of the Dual
Process Model of Moral Judgment, 6 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 186 (2011);
Adam B. Moore et al., Who Shalt Not Kill? Individual Differences in Working
Memory Capacity, Executive Control, and Moral Judgment, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549
(2008) [hereinafter Moore et al., Who Shalt Not Kill?].
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the switch. Moore found that one of the key determinants of the acceptability of such an action was whether the actor would be required
to use direct physical force to cause harm, such as pushing a large
man in front of the trolley, instead of flipping a switch, as in the classic case.50 If the actor needed to push the sacrificed individual off a
bridge, shove him through an airlock, or smother him with his hands,
the action was much less acceptable than if the actor needed to bring
about the exact same effect by pushing a button.51 This directness
factor was substantially more important than some elements that traditionally have philosophical relevance, such as whether the death of
the sacrificed person was an intentional means to accomplish the beneficial end or a foreseen, but unintended, consequence.52
How, if at all, are considerations of directness likely to bear on lay
judgments of the blameworthiness of insider trading behavior? The
answer to this question may turn on the choice between the unfairness/cheating theory and the breach-of-duty-to-the-source-ofinformation theory. Under the unfairness/cheating approach, the
harms and wrongs of insider trading primarily affect other traders in
the market—those without access to the confidential information.
The harms are fairly indirect in that they are inflicted on a typically
unidentified target who may not even be aware that he has been
cheated. By contrast, under the breach-of-duty-to-the-source-ofinformation approach, the harms and wrongs of insider trading typically affect the company for which the insider trader works or from
whom he obtained and misappropriated the information. Here, the
harms and wrongs of insider trading may be seen as more “direct,” at
least in normal cases.
V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PUBLIC VIEWS OF INSIDER TRADING
We conducted three linked studies intended to elicit lay views of
insider trading. The first study focused on the extent to which the
way a trader obtains inside information affects lay judgments about
blameworthiness and punishability. Would our subjects think that
traders should be blamed and punished merely for trading on the basis of non-public information, or would they insist that the trader
breach a duty to the source of the information or to the shareholders
of the company in whose stock he was trading? The second study fo-

50. See Moore et al., Who Shalt Not Kill?, supra note 48, at 556.
51. See id. at 549.
52. See id. at 550 (discussing Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of double effect).
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cused on lay views regarding a number of narrower, but nevertheless
significant, issues in insider trading law. We wanted to see if, and under what circumstances, our subjects would approve of punishing insider trading by means of civil, rather than criminal, sanctions, particularly with respect to differences in the amount of money earned
through trading. In addition, we wanted to test our subjects’ views on
doctrinal issues concerning “use” versus mere “possession” of confidential information and “tipper” versus “tippee” liability. The final
study sought to probe the underlying thinking that might inform subjects’ views about the blameworthiness of insider trading.
A. Study 1—Initial Look at Insider Trading
In our initial study, we wished to test whether our subjects would
make different judgments about culpability based on the means by
which the trader came to acquire non-public information. Would our
subjects think that defendants should be punished merely for trading
on the basis of an arguably unfair advantage derived from the possession of non-public information (along the lines of Texas Gulf Sulphur), or would they insist that the trader breach a pre-existing duty
in such trading, whether to shareholders of the firm whose stock they
were trading in (as required by Chiarella) or to the source of the information (as in O’Hagan and Carpenter)?
There is also the question whether insider trading liability should
apply to those who trade on the basis of inside information when they
are neither insiders nor misappropriators. Where such people receive
information from one who is an insider or misappropriator (a “tipper”), they are known as “tippees.” The Supreme Court has held that
a tippee can be liable for insider trading based on a “derivative”
breach of duty—that is, a duty that derives from the tipper’s breach.53
But the Court has made clear that such tippee liability exists only
when (1) the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee, and (2) the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach.54
We were particularly interested in those cases in which the tipper
did not intend to benefit the tippee, as where the tippee overhears a
conversation that the (inadvertent) tipper thought was private, and
then trades on that information. Should such conduct be treated as
insider trading? Here, the level of intentionality of the listener may
53. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
54. See id. at 660.
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play an important role: passively overhearing a conversation is substantially less direct than seeking out information as a reporter or
dealing with it in the course of one’s job as an executive. The SEC
has taken the position that a tippee can be liable even where the tipper did not intend to benefit the tippee.55 The Supreme Court has not
considered the issue, but lower courts have split. At least one lower
court decision, Securities & Exchange Commission v. Musella, has
followed the SEC’s position.56 Likewise, at least one lower court decision, Securities & Exchange Commission v. Switzer, has disagreed.57
We investigate these issues more fully in Study 2.
To examine lay perceptions of these questions, we formulated a
scenario in which: an individual has non-public information that ABC
Corp is about to make a public announcement that it is acquiring a
majority share in XYZ Corp. On the basis of this information and
without disclosing his knowledge of it, the individual buys stock in
XYZ. After the merger has been made public, the individual sells the
stock at a price substantially above what he paid for it, thereby earning a handsome profit.
We then presented seven variations of this scenario, each with different facts about who the individual was and how he came to possess
the non-public information on which he based his trade.
In three of the variations, the individual trading in XYZ stock was
an insider at either the acquiring company or the target company. In
one case, the trader, Richards, was a senior executive at the target
company, XYZ. This scenario corresponded to the so-called traditional or classical form of insider trading in that the duty Richards
presumably violated was to the shareholders of his company. In a second case, the trader, Williams, again worked for the target company
in which the stock was bought, but this time as a secretary who handled papers containing confidential information about the merger
prior to its public announcement. This case also corresponded to the
traditional theory, but Williams was arguably less an “insider” than
55. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 104 (2002).
56. See S.E.C. v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 898 F.2d 138
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a law firm manager who gave material non-public information to defendants who profited from the information was liable for insider trading
because he breached a duty of silence to his law firm).
57. S.E.C. v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that defendant
had not committed insider trading where he traded on information overheard in the
stands at a high school track meet, from a man he knew to be the CEO of a publicly
held corporation, since CEO “tipper” had not violated a fiduciary duty to his firm’s
shareholders).
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Richards. In a third case, the trader, Brown, was a senior executive at
the acquiring company, ABC, who bought stock in the target company, XYZ. This scenario corresponded to the so-called misappropriation theory in that the duty that Brown presumably violated was to
the firm from which he misappropriated the information (ABC), rather than to the shareholders of the company in which Brown had
bought shares (XYZ). We predicted that these three scenarios would
be judged as most deserving of criminal penalties and that the traders
who were senior executives would be judged more harshly than the
secretary, partly because high-powered finance professionals are supposed to know the rules concerning insider trading in a way that clerical employees might not be expected to, and partly because they are
presumably much better compensated. We did not anticipate any
significant difference between people’s judgments of the executive
who satisfied the traditional theory (Richards) and the executive who
satisfied the misappropriation theory (Brown).
In the next two variations, the trader came into the non-public information as a result of his work for a third party. In one case, the
trader, Buckley, worked as a “markup man” at a commercial printing
company that prints documents for companies involved in mergers,
including the merger between ABC and XYZ.58 Although the trader
was not privy to the information, he deduced it from documents that
were being printed in his shop. In the other case, the person doing
the trading, Anderson, was an investigative reporter for a major business newspaper. Through his sources, he learned about the impending merger and wrote an article about it. Just before the article was
published, and on the basis of the information contained in it, he
bought stock in XYZ.59 We predicted that the actors in both of these
cases would be rated as deserving of criminal sanctions, but less than
the traders in the three cases previously described.
In the final two variations, the trader had no connection to either
firm. In one case, the trader, Taylor, was described as being in the
back of a cab, on his way home after work, when he found a memo
marked ‘Confidential – Not for Release.’ The memo describes the
proposed merger. In the other case, the trader, White, trades on information which he happens to overhear at a ball game where several

58. This scenario corresponds closely to Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
59. This case is analogous to Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024 (1986); see
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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employees of ABC are discussing the proposed merger.60 In the final
two variations, the most tangential cases, unintended tippees trade
based on non-public information. They provide a strong test of
whether an unfair informational advantage on the part of the trader is
a sufficient condition to elicit condemnation.

1.

Study 1 Method

For this study, we recruited fifty participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. This approach allowed for a diverse sample of
adult Americans. Data from two individuals were discarded owing to
an abnormally fast completion time (less than half the median) or incorrectly answering a question intended to screen inattentive participants.61 Of the remaining forty-eight participants (eighteen male,
thirty female), the median age was thirty-eight. Of the participants,
58% had college degrees.
The study began with a brief description of its procedure. Participants were told that the study concerned evaluating how people act in
social situations. After giving their consent to continue, participants
were shown a question, which the instructions told them to bypass rather than answer. Those who recorded an answer were marked as inattentive, as mentioned above. Participants then completed a page of
individual difference questions. These included self-rated political
orientation, ranging from one (Very Conservative) to seven (Very
Liberal); faith in various public institutions such as government,
courts, defense attorneys, and the like, ranging from one (Not much
faith) to seven (A lot of faith); and eight items from the Competitive
World Beliefs scale.62
Following the individual difference measures, participants were
given instructions describing the format of the scenarios. Participants
were told that they would view a core “story” with multiple possible
“endings” and that it was for them to determine which distinctions, if

60. This scenario corresponds closely to Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756; see supra note
57 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Daniel Oppenheimer et al., Instructional Manipulation Checks:
Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 867 (2009) (explaining the use of applicant screening to increase statistical
power).
62. See generally Chris G. Sibley & John Duckitt, Big-Five Personality, Social

Worldviews, and Ideological Attitudes: Further Tests of a Dual Process CognitiveMotivational Model, 149 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 545 (2009) (explaining the effect of per-

sonality and related dispositions on predictive models).
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any, were relevant. All scenarios were presented on the same
webpage. The scenarios and their various endings were not labeled.
After each scenario, participants were asked three questions. First,
they were asked to rate the moral blameworthiness of the described
act on a scale ranging from one (Not at All Blameworthy) to seven
(Very Blameworthy). Second, they were asked whether the act
should be treated as criminal (Yes/No). Third, they were asked how
severely, if at all, the person should be punished on a scale ranging
from one (No Punishment) to seven (Severely Punished).
Basic demographics (age, sex, occupation, educational attainment,
and state of residence) were collected at the end of the study. Participants were also asked whether they owned stock or had traded stock
professionally, whether they had ever bought stock on a tip from a
friend or relative, and how much they knew about investing in stocks
and bonds.

2.

Study 1 Results

As Table 1 shows, the seven scenarios can be grouped loosely into
three “bands” of seriousness.63 Because blameworthiness, punishment severity, and the percentage of the sample criminalizing an activity were consistent in nearly every case, those factors are discussed
together. In the first band, containing three scenarios, the person doing the trading in XYZ stock was an insider at either the acquiring or
target company. These cases elicited substantial punitiveness ratings
from our participants. The two most serious cases were those involving executives at the acquiring (83%) or acquired (79%) companies.
The secretary at the acquired company was judged to be slightly less
blameworthy than the executives, but his conduct was criminalized
(77%) and punished to the same degree. Respondents thus made essentially no distinction between the classical and misappropriation
theories with respect to criminalization, blameworthiness, or punishment.

63. Data on blameworthiness and punishment severity were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA. Scores varied across condition for both blameworthiness
F(3, 161) =26.56, p < .001 and punishment F(3, 144) = 22.43, p < .001. Due to a sphericity violation, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used in these analyses. Comparison of means for those measures (Table 1) is based on post-hoc tests. The criminalization question had a binary response format. We therefore conducted
McNemar’s within-subjects chi-square tests on that data (one degree of freedom).
Alpha was set at .05 for all analyses.
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Table 1—Ratings of Study 1 Scenarios in Terms of
Blameworthiness, Deserved Punishment, and Percentage of the
Sample Criminalizing the Activity

Executive at Acquiring Company
Executive at Acquired Company
Secretary at Acquired Company
Markup Man
Reporter
Memo Found in
Cab
Remark Overheard
at Game

Blameworthiness
5.69a (1.64)

Punishment
4.27a (1.81)

Percent Criminalizing
83.3%a

5.52a (1.74)

4.33a (1.74)

79.2%a

5.13b (1.81)

4.02a (1.83)

77.1%a

4.71b (1.77)
4.63b (1.92)
3.81c (2.14)

3.25b (1.97)
3.25b (1.99)
2.54c (1.81)

60.4%b
58.3%b
37.5%c

2.94d (1.96)

1.98d (1.48)

18.8%d

For each variable, numbers sharing subscripts are not significantly different from
each other. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Blameworthiness and punishment scores are on scales ranging from one to seven.

In the next band of seriousness, the trader came into the information as a result of his work for a third party (either a financial
printer or a newspaper). Sixty percent of participants sanctioned the
markup man, whose case paralleled the facts of Chiarella. Fifty-eight
percent of respondents sanctioned the reporter, whose case paralleled
Carpenter. This slight mitigation, as compared to the first three cases,
could be the result of several factors. Most obviously, these two traders were operating a step removed from the two companies in question. To the extent that the salient victim of the bad act is the source
of the information, this added distance may have led people to mitigate their punishment. Still, a strong majority criminalized the actions of both of these individuals, and this outcome provides support
for the view that even corporate “outsiders” who trade on the basis of
inside information should be subject to prosecution in appropriate
cases.
In the scenarios making up the final band, the trader had no connection to either firm. Thirty-seven percent of participants sanctioned the cab rider who found and read the confidential memo, and
19% sanctioned the person who overheard a conversation at a baseball game. These two cases, particularly the second, represent a hard
test of the pure unfairness rationale for banning insider trading. In
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each case we see that a minority do adopt this view, despite a lack of
plausible connection or duty between the beneficiary and either firm,
but that the majority clearly rejects it. This result lends some credence to a breach of obligation account: in neither case did the recipient of information actively pursue that information, and in the case
where the recipient acquired the information truly incidentally, very
few people sought to impose punishment.
From a practical perspective, the social cost of “insider” trading by
lucky outsiders is likely to be fairly minor. Few people will find themselves in a position to gain such inside information and, if they do,
they are unlikely to do so repeatedly. They therefore can cause minor market distortions, but they certainly do not break the system. A
corporate insider, on the other hand, could cheat on a regular basis
and, if allowed to do so, would ultimately undermine confidence in
the fairness of the market.64 Perhaps participants were aware, whether explicitly or implicitly, of this difference. Another possibility is
that while participants did not approve of trading by these inadvertent insiders, they nevertheless backed away from labeling them as
“criminal.” In Study 2, we included a civil punishment option to account for this concern.
Past research has sometimes found differences in punitiveness toward certain kinds of white collar offenders based on the gender,
race, or educational attainment of the participant.65 In this study, neither gender, stock market experience, nor educational level had an
effect.66 Given our comparatively small sample size, it is not necessarily safe to assume that such differences do not exist. Rather, we
only assume that, if they do exist, the differences are likely not large.
The sample was not large enough to test meaningfully for ethnic differences.
64. But see Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to the Rescue?: Insider Trading as
a Tool to Combat Accounting Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 973, 1000–05 (2011) (arguing

that the assumption that insider trading undermines investor confidence may be unfounded).
65. For a useful summary, see Kristy Holtfreter et al., Public Perceptions of
White-Collar Crime and Punishment, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 50, 52 (2008). See generally
James D. Unnever et al., Public Support for Getting Tough on Corporate Crime: Racial and Political Divides, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 163 (2008).
66. For these analyses, we created overall composites of the blameworthiness,
punishment severity, and criminality measures by averaging across the seven scenarios. None of the individual difference measures (political orientation, competitive
world beliefs, and trust in various social institutions) correlated with these composite
scores. We did not examine race due to the size of the sample and limited number of
participants from minority groups.
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B. Study 2—Criminal vs. Civil Liability, Tipper vs. Tippee
Liability, and Other Doctrinal Puzzles in Insider Trading Law
From Study 1, we know that people tend to support prohibitions on
at least some forms of insider trading and are willing to punish those
who are, in various ways, entrusted with confidential information and
abuse it for personal benefit. We also found that people were more
reluctant to punish in several cases when an individual acquired information by chance. To shed more light on the distinctions that are
important in the law and potentially in lay morality, we conducted a
second study that considered nuances within insider trading law. We
also introduced a new punishment option: participants in Study 2
could choose between permitting a behavior, criminalizing it, or, new
to this study, assigning a civil penalty. This better mirrored the options available in real life cases and allowed us to see whether participants actually wanted to permit certain kinds of insider trading or
were simply reluctant to go so far as to criminalize them.

1.
a.

New Distinctions Investigated in Study 2
“Possessing” vs. “Using” Information

A defendant who is charged with insider trading will sometimes
contend that he had planned to purchase or sell the stock regardless
of the inside information. For example, business magnate Martha
Stewart, in defending against insider trading charges brought against
her in connection with the sale of ImClone stock, claimed that she
had a standing order with her broker to sell her shares as soon as the
price dropped below $60 per share.67 The question thus arises whether the defendant must actually rely on the inside information in deciding whether to trade, or whether mere possession is enough.
The SEC has traditionally taken the position that possession, rather than use, of material nonpublic information is sufficient to trigger liability.68 The courts, however, are divided on the issue. The Se-

67. See United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). As it
turned out, the SEC’s investigation produced evidence that Stewart and her broker
had fabricated the existence of such a standing order. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays,
Stewart Inquiry Is Said to Focus on Lack of a Sell Order, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/business/stewart-inquiry-is-said-to-focus-on-lackof-a-sell-order.html.
68. See, e.g., In re Sterling Drug Inc., No. 14675, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1759, at *13–
14 (Apr. 18, 1978); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2011) (triggering liability when
a person purchases or sells securities while “aware” of material nonpublic infor-
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cond Circuit has followed the SEC’s “possession” rule, stating that
“material information cannot lie idle in the human brain.”69 Under
this approach, the only way that a defendant who was “aware” of such
information could avoid liability is by showing that he engaged in the
transaction pursuant to a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction.70
By contrast, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that proof of
use, rather than mere possession, must be shown—the defendant’s
knowledge of such information must constitute a substantial factor in
his decision to purchase or sell the subject securities at a particular
price or at a particular time.71
We wanted to see what our lay subjects would think about this issue. We imagined two contrasting scenarios. Both involved a senior
executive at a company buying stock in that company immediately
before information was released that was expected to make the
stock’s value increase. In both cases, the executive was privy to confidential information about the merger prior to its public announcement.
In one scenario, the executive “[used] the information to assess the
value of the company and without disclosing his knowledge of it,
[bought] stock in XYZ.” Subjects were told that the executive
“would not have bought the stock if he did not have this information.” In the other scenario, subjects were told that, in addition to
the inside information, the executive had “access to the same public
information about the company as everyone else” and would have
bought stock in XYZ even if he had not had the confidential information.
We predicted that our subjects would regard the executive who actually relied on the information in making his decision to buy the
stock as more blameworthy than the executive who relied on other
information and would have bought the stock anyway. Where the
trader actually relied on the information, he used his arguably unfair
advantage to gain an upper hand. In that sense, he cheated. In the
other scenario, he did not rely on his unfair informational advantage
and in that sense cannot be said to have cheated.

mation). See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 374
(5th ed. 2009).
69. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993).
70. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(A).
71. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998); S.E.C. v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Amount of Insider Trader’s Profits and Professional Status of
Trader

In theory, any actor who commits insider trading, however defined,
is potentially subject to criminal penalties.72 In practice, however, only a relatively small percentage of insider trading cases lead to criminal charges. Most are treated civilly.73 Two factors that play an important role in determining whether an insider trading case will be
pursued criminally by the DOJ or just civilly by the SEC are: (1) how
much money the individual earned from the insider trading scheme;
and (2) whether the trader was a licensed professional, such as an investment banker, broker, trader, investment adviser, attorney, or accountant.74
Probably the most significant factor that determines whether a case
will be treated as civil or criminal is the size of the defendant’s illgotten gains. According to a recent study by the New York State Bar
Association, the DOJ is much more likely to prosecute those cases in
which the amount of money earned was greater than $100,000.75 Cases involving smaller profits will normally be treated civilly. The same
study also shows that licensed professionals are substantially more
likely to face criminal prosecution than officers and directors of public companies who conduct insider trading in their companies’ stock.76
Using the same basic scenario as above (senior executive trades
on the basis of inside information), we offered two variations. In one,
as a result of the transaction, the executive made a profit of $25,000.
In the other, the executive made a profit of $250,000. We predicted
72. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
73. Under the Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual, even if
there is evidence to show that a person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, the
prosecutor should decline prosecuting if, among other things, there is an “adequate
non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” 9-27.220: Grounds for Commencing or Declining Prosecution, USAM PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, http://www.
justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220 (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). The AUSA should also decline prosecution if: (1) “No substantial
Federal interest would be served by prosecution,” or (2) “The person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction.” Id.
74. See Securities Subcommittee of the White Collar Criminal Litig. Comm.,

Criminal Prosecutorial Discretion in Insider Trading Cases: Let’s Look at the Numbers, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 3–4, (May 12, 2010), http://www.nysba.org/Content/
ContentFolders4/CommercialandFederalLitigationSection/ComFedReports/CRIMI
NALPROSECUTORIALDISCRETIONINTHEINSIDERTRADINGCASES.pdf.
75. See id. at 13.
76. See id. at 9 (explaining that during the relevant time period, DOJ pursued
61% of cases involving licensed professionals and only about 33% of cases involving
officers or directors of public companies).
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that our subjects would find the executive who obtained a profit of
$250,000 more deserving of punishment than the executive who
earned only $25,000.
In one sense, the difference between the executive who earned
$25,000 and the executive who earned $250,000 is a matter of “moral
luck.” The issue is similar to that which arises in the case of unsuccessful, or partially successful, attempts. Imagine two pickpockets at
work in a crowd. Both are equal in terms of skill, determination, and
neediness. Yet the “lucky” pickpocket finds a wallet bursting with
hundred dollar bills, while the “unlucky” pickpocket finds a wallet
that turns out to be empty. Is the unlucky pickpocket any less
blameworthy than the lucky one? Should his punishment be any less?
People’s intuitions vary widely, and there is a large body of ethics and
philosophy of law literature about whether, all else being equal, the
unlucky wrongdoer should be punished any less severely than the
lucky one.77 Previous empirical studies have found that, despite the
deep divide among scholars, most lay people believe that the unlucky
attempter should in fact be punished less severely than the lucky
one.78
Of course, everything else here is not necessarily equal. Our
scenarios did not explain why one trader earned so much more from
his trading than the other. It could be that he traded a much larger
number of shares of stock, or perhaps the stocks he invested in were
more valuable, or perhaps the swing in price was significantly greater.
The study instrument did not say. Instead, we simply focused on the
fact that trader 1 was more successful than trader 2, and therefore arguably caused more harm to some unidentified victim or to the market generally.
We also varied the trader’s professional status. In one set of scenarios, the trader was a “top executive” at a large company. In other
scenarios, the trader was a secretary at the firm or a markup man at a
financial printer. We predicted that, other things being equal, the executive would be judged more harshly than the others, both because
he would be expected to have a higher level of familiarity with the
77. See generally, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, Taking the Consequences, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 107 (Stephen Shute et. al. eds., 1993); THOMAS
NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 35 (Robert B. Louden ed., 1981); Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994); Sanford Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law
and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994).
78. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 186–88 (1996).
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law, and because his compensation, absent the insider trading, would
presumably be higher.

c.

Tipper vs. Tippee Liability

Most of the cases we have looked at so far have involved persons with inside information who themselves trade on the basis of
such information. But what about cases in which an insider gives
nonpublic information to another individual, and it is the second individual who does the trading? How should the liability of the “tipper”
(the person who discloses material, nonpublic information to another
individual) compare to the liability of the “tippee” (the person who
trades on the basis of the information received from the tipper)?
Other things being equal, should the tipper be regarded as more, less,
or equally blameworthy to the tippee?
The courts have said that the tippee’s liability is “derivative” of the
tipper’s. Thus, if the tipper is not liable (say, because he had no duty
of confidentiality to the source of information), then the tippee also
would not be liable.79 This does not necessarily mean that the tipper
will be subject to more serious punishment than the tippee, though as
a practical matter tippers do seem to face a higher risk of criminal
prosecution than do tippees or sole actors. For example, in the New
York Bar study cited above, 58% of the SEC defendants selected by
the DOJ for prosecution were tippers, whereas 36% were tippees,
and 6% were sole actors who did not tip anyone.80
But why should the tippee’s liability be thought of as derivative of
the tipper’s? It is the tippee, after all, who actually engages in trading. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the tipper’s liability is derivative of the tippee’s —that the tipper is in some sense an
accomplice or aider and abettor of the tippee’s conduct. Under this
approach, the tipper is like the actor who provides a gun to the
would-be killer, but does not use it himself.
There are really two questions at issue here. The first is: which
kind of liability is conceptually more basic—the tipper’s or tippee’s?
The answer to this question turns on the deeper question of why insider trading is wrong to begin with. If one believes (as Green has argued) that the basic wrong of insider trading lies in the fact that the
insider uses an unfair advantage against other traders and thereby
79. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974).
80. See Criminal Prosecutorial Discretion in Insider Trading Cases: Let’s Look at
the Numbers, supra note 74, at 3.
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“cheats” them, then it would seem that it is the tippee who commits
the more basic wrong, and that the tipper’s liability is derivative. If,
on the other hand, one believes (as does a majority of the Supreme
Court) that the basic wrong in insider trading is the misappropriation
of information, then it would seem that the more basic wrong is
committed by the tipper, and that the tippee’s liability is the derivative one.
The second question is whether any of this should make a difference in practice. Regardless of which form of liability is conceptually
more basic, we might simply decide that the two should be treated as
equally worthy of punishment. This is what has generally occurred
with accomplice liability in criminal law, where the same punishment
typically applies to both the offender who gives support and the offender who directly causes the harm.81
For present purposes, we cannot hope to resolve either of these issues. Instead, we are simply interested in knowing how our lay subjects would judge the question of relative blameworthiness. All else
being equal, who do they believe is more deserving of punishment:
the tipper who gives confidential information to another individual,
or the tippee who receives the information and trades on the basis of
it? Or do they think they should be treated as equivalent?
An additional question related to the liability of the tipper is
whether he must obtain any personal benefit from making the tip.
Traditionally, under the classical theory, a defendant who is prosecuted for insider trading will incur liability only if he “personally benefitted” from the tip.82 The leading case is Dirks v. Securities & Exchange Commission.83 In Dirks, Secrist, a former employee of Equity
Funding American (EFA), revealed to an investment analyst, Dirks,

81. Though Green has argued here as well, contrary to the prevailing view, that
this outcome is a mistake and that accomplices ordinarily ought to be punished less
severely than principals. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A
MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006). See generally Joshua Dressler,

Reassessing the Theoretical Understandings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions
to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985).
82. If the defendant is prosecuted under the misappropriation theory, however,
some district courts have explicitly held that the personal benefit test is inapplicable.
See S.E.C. v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); S.E.C. v. Musella,
748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). On the other hand, a number of
courts have held that proof of personal benefit is a required element to prove tipper/tippee liability under the misappropriation theory. The most significant opinion
is the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in S.E.C. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir.
2003).
83. 463 U.S. 646.
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that EFA was being fraudulently managed, a fact that constituted material, nonpublic information. Apparently, Secrist’s sole motivation
in revealing this information to Dirks was to reveal the fraud. Dirks,
in turn, revealed this information to a number of people, including his
own clients, who thereafter sold their shares in EFA.84 The Supreme
Court held that Dirks was not liable for insider trading, finding that,
absent personal benefit to Secrist as a result of the tip to Dirks,
Secrist had not breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders.85 The
Court also identified three types of personal benefit that a tipper may
receive from making a tip: (1) a pecuniary benefit (such as a kickback
or profit-sharing arrangement); (2) a reputational benefit (such as
when a corporate officer provides information to an analyst in hopes
that the analyst will report about him favorably); and (3) a benefit
from making a gift.86
To test our subjects’ views on these issues, we gave them several
scenarios involving both tippers and tippees and asked them to judge
their relative blameworthiness. In each of these scenarios, we contrasted the blameworthiness and punishment meted out to the tipper
with that assigned to the tippee, and both to the baseline case of an
executive trading on his own inside information for his own benefit.
In one tipper/tippee scenario, the executive did not himself trade on
inside information, but passed the information on to a professional
stock analyst whom he knew casually and with whom he hoped to do
business in the future. The executive hoped to impress the analyst
with his access to inside information. The analyst then bought stock
based on the inside information. This was the tip-for-gain case. In a
contrasting scenario, an insider at a company revealed confidential information to a business reporter with the intent of exposing fraudulent business practices and protecting shareholders from (in this case)
a bad merger. No personal benefit, except perhaps reputational,
would accrue to the “tipper” in this case—paralleling the Dirks case.
The reporter then traded on the information, making a substantial
profit.
We predicted that, other things being equal, our subjects would
view the person who actually uses the confidential information to buy
stock (the tippee) as more blameworthy than the person who merely
divulges the information and does not use it (the tipper). This would
reflect our view that the principal wrong in insider trading comes
84. See id. at 649.
85. See id. at 666–67.
86. See id. at 663–64.
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from a sole trader or tippee using an unfair advantage vis-à-vis other
investors, and that the tipper is merely an accomplice in this act. This
would be especially clear if the tipper’s motive was innocent; being
the unwitting accomplice to another’s insider trading should attract
relatively little punishment.

d.

Existence of Confidential Relationship

As noted above, the misappropriation theory of insider trading applies only when stock is traded on the basis of “material nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.”87 To find out when our subjects would find a breach of the
duty of trust or confidence, we constructed two scenarios. In one
case, an executive leaked information to his brother with the intent of
impressing him (as in the tip-for-gain case). The brother then traded
on the information, making a handsome profit. This was, more or
less, the scenario contemplated by SEC Rule 10b5-2, which imposed
liability where the disclosing person and the recipient have a familial
relationship, even in the absence of some other duty of confidentiality.88
We also thought it was worth posing a case in which a confidential
relationship arises out of a different sort of association. We had in
mind a class of cases in which a government employee has advanced
notice of still-confidential information that would affect the value of a
given stock—for example, information about whether a drug is about
to be approved for general distribution; whether a judge is going to
rule for the plaintiff or the defendant; whether a legislator will vote
yes or no on proposed legislation. People who have access to such information as government employees may arguably have an even
higher level of duty to maintain confidences than those in private
business.89 We therefore constructed a scenario in which an official at
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had advance knowledge
that a drug is about to be approved. The official buys stock in the
drug company prior to the announcement and later sells it, making a
handsome profit.

87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(a) (2011).
88. See id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3).
89. In our previous work on bribery and gratuities, we found that government officials were held to higher standards than corporate officials. See Green & Kugler,
Public Perceptions, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22).
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Study 2 Method

Once again, we solicited participants for this study from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk service. Because of the greater number of scenarios
in this study, we recruited 101 subjects. Data from three individuals
were discarded owing to an abnormally fast completion time (less
than half the median) or incorrectly answering a question intended to
screen inattentive participants. Of the remaining ninety-eight participants (forty-four male, fifty-four female), the median age was twentyeight. Of the participants, 53% had college degrees.
The procedure for the second insider trading study mirrored that of
the first with several important exceptions. First, this study—owing
to the greater number of scenarios—split the various scenarios across
web pages. As a result, the participants could not easily view all of
the cases before beginning to respond, but it was possible for participants to move backward and forward through the survey and modify
their answers, if they so desired. This format did, however, raise the
possibility of order effects. To address this concern, we created two
orders and contrasted them in analysis.
To review, we employed a substantial number of scenarios in this
study. As described above, we had a pair of scenarios contrasting an
insider who used information as the basis for his trade with one who
possessed the information, but would have made the stock purchase
even without it; a pair contrasting large and small gains, three sets of
tippers and tippees; and one government official trading in advance of
a regulatory decision. We also reused the memo-found-in cab and
remark-heard-at-ballgame scenarios to see if the civil punishment option altered responses.
We also made a substantial change to one of the answer choices.
We maintained the blameworthiness and punishment severity questions without modification, but the criminality question was replaced
with one asking whether the conduct described should be permitted,
treated civilly, or punished criminally. We added a special instruction
screen at the beginning of the study to explain the distinction between
civil and criminal penalties and asked subjects to describe the distinction in their own words.
Finally, we made two small methodological changes. As noted
above, the individual differences measured in Study 1 failed to affect
the scenario judgments. We therefore removed many of the attitudinal items, retaining only the overall ratings of political orientation
and demographics (including stock-related questions). Also, as we
split the scenarios across multiple study screens, we modified our sce-
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narios so that they “stood alone” more effectively; the scenarios were
all freestanding rather than being endings to a common story.
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Study 2 Results

Responses to the scenarios did not differ across the two scenario
orders; for example, participants gave the same ratings to the scenarios contrasting high versus low amount gained whether they preceded
or followed the “would have bought anyway” cases, and the same ratings to the “tip for gain” case regardless of whether it was the first or
last of the tip cases. This allowed us to combine participants across
orders in all subsequent analyses. The design of this study was centered on a series of planned contrasts (between tippers and tippees,
large and small gains, would or would not have bought anyway, et
cetera). We therefore employed a somewhat different analysis strategy and report only those contrasts rather than a comprehensive
analysis.90 We also compare the scenarios within a pair to the case in
which a classic insider makes a stock purchase based on inside information that he otherwise would not have made. This case reflected a
prototypical example of insider trading and could serve as a baseline.

a.

Liability for Direct Buyers

For our first contrast, we compared the cases in which the insider
possessed inside information, but did not rely on it—and thus would
have made the stock purchase anyway—with the case in which the insider would not have otherwise purchased the stock. The data show
that lay people can and do draw a distinction here: when the insider
would have made the stock purchase anyway, he was blamed significantly less and people wished to punish him significantly less severely.
When evaluating how the case should be resolved, people selected
harsher channels (criminal over civil, civil over no punishment) when
evaluating the actor who used the information as a basis for trading.91
When the actor would have bought anyway, a substantial minority
thought that the conduct was entirely permissible (43%) and most of
the remainder would have opted for a civil penalty. When the executive would not have otherwise purchased the stock, in contrast, only
90. For the blameworthiness and punishment severity questions, we used withinsubjects t-tests. Our analysis approach in this study differs in that we report only the
planned contrasts and therefore are less likely to have a multiple comparison issue.
The question asking whether the conduct should be permitted, treated civilly, or punished criminally was coded for each set of paired scenarios to reflect whether one
scenario was to be treated with more, equally, or less serious means than the other.
The more and less serious options were then contrasted using a McNemar test, as before.
91. Blameworthiness t = 10.14, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 9.55, p < 0.001;
preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 94) = 40.14, p < 001.
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12% of participants thought his conduct was permissible and a full
38% thought it merited criminal treatment.
The two scenarios which varied the size of the gain were rated as
equally blameworthy, but they were punished differently. When
evaluating the actor who made the larger gain, participants assigned
greater punishment and were more likely to prefer criminal sanctions
(45%) than when evaluating the actor who made a smaller gain (34%
for criminal sanctions).92 These differences, though small, show that
participants were willing to prioritize when meting out punishment
even while seeing blameworthiness as constant.
The confidential-memo-found-in-cab and remark-overheard-atballgame cases presented traders who came into insider information
accidentally, rather than within the context of a previously existing
duty. The trader who reads the confidential memo left behind in a
cab is blamed and punished less than the actor in the control wouldnot-otherwise-have-made-the-trade case, and participants were much
more likely to judge his conduct as permissible.93 Interestingly, the
trader in the ballgame case was blamed and punished even less than
the trader in the cab case.94 As we speculated in Study 1, this may be
because the person finding the memo in the cab took some direct action to acquire the information and was at least made aware, by the
label on the memo, that the information was confidential. The addition of a civil penalty option may have had some effect on results, as
the permissible/not criminal option was down 10% in this study as
compared to Study 1.
Finally, the FDA case presented an interesting wrinkle on insider
trading. The FDA official may have a duty of confidentiality to his
employer (the government) or a derivative duty as part of an agency
entrusted to review trade secrets, but he does not have a direct duty
to the company in question. In that sense, this scenario is closely
analogous to the Carpenter case. But participants still viewed the official as acting inappropriately. He was blamed as much, punished as
severely, and subject to criminal punishment as often as the actor in
the would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade case.95
92. Blameworthiness t = 1.22, ns.; punishment severity t = 6.75, p < 0.001; preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 91) = 5.56, p < 05.
93. Blameworthiness t = 7.48, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 8.63, p < 0.001;
preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 94) = 37.93, p < 001.
94. Blameworthiness t = 6.56, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 11.61, p < 0.001;
preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 92) = 20.01, p < 001.
95. Blameworthiness t = 1.52, ns.; punishment severity t = 0.85, ns.; preferred
treatment method 2 (1, N = 94) = .22, ns.
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Tipper/Tippee Liability

Reactions to the tippers and tippees in our scenarios depended
greatly on the circumstances of the tip. When the executive tipped
the analyst for personal gain, participants blamed the executive approximately the same amount as the analyst, and punished him slightly less. This judgment, however, had no impact on whether participants believed the conduct should be treated civilly or criminally.96
As in the small and large gain cases, this may reflect punishment priorities. The analyst’s purchase of the stock is seen as being as blameworthy, deserving of punishment, and worth pursuing criminally or
civilly, as was the defendant in the would-have bought-the-stockanyway executive case.97 The tippee received no liability discount.
An executive tipping a reporter to expose a bad deal produces a
very different set of reactions. Participants blamed and punished the
reporter as much as in the would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade
case and were as likely to punish him civilly and criminally.98 Participants blamed and punished the executive tipping for apparently altruistic reasons far less, however. The participants were also much less
likely to subject this executive to sanctions than the reporter or the
executive in the would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade case. Of
the participants, 54% thought that the executive’s conduct in tipping
for altruistic reasons should be permissible, and only 7% thought it
should be subject to criminal sanctions. 99
The case involving a tip obtained from a relative was again distinct,
if only slightly. Participants blamed and punished both the tipper and
the tippee less than the executive in the would-not-otherwise-havemade-the-trade case, but only the tippee was less likely to be dealt
with civilly or criminally, and that difference was small. The tipper
and tippee in this case were treated equivalently.100
96. Blameworthiness t = 1.82, p = 0.07; punishment severity t = 2.99, p < 0.004;
preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 95) = 2.33, ns.
97. Blameworthiness t = 0.79, ns.; punishment severity t = 0.08, ns.; preferred
treatment method 2 (1, N = 93) = 0.10, ns.
98. Blameworthiness t = 1.71, ns.; punishment severity t = 1.25, ns.; preferred
treatment method 2 (1, N = 92) = .023, ns.
99. As compared to the reporter: blameworthiness t = 11.17, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 10.07, p < 0.001; preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 94) = 44.72, p
< .001. As compared to the executive who would not have traded but for the nonpublic information: blameworthiness t = 9.96, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 11.40, p
< 0.001; preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 94) = 43.75, p < .001.
100. Family tipper compared to would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade executive: blameworthiness t = 2.43, p = 0.02; punishment severity t = 2.08, p = 0.04; preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 93) = 2.68, ns. Family tippee compared to would-
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Study 3—Subjects’ Underlying Reasoning

In our final study, we wanted to further explore the motivations
underlying lay condemnation of insider trading. As previously discussed, one theory holds that insider trading is wrong because it is
“cheating.”101 It is not merely that one party has an advantage over
another, but also that the advantaged party has acquired his advantage in a way that violates the accepted rules of the game. Though
the magnitude of the advantage that the various actors hold has generally been held constant—to the extent that gains have been specified, they have not varied across most scenarios—participants still
draw substantial distinctions between cases, apparently based on the
degree of moral violation involved in obtaining the information.
Those who are trusted explicitly with inside information are punished
much more than those who acquire it by chance, for example. Here,
we wished to go further in two ways. First, we wanted to assess lay
reactions to a case in which a person acquires a substantial advantage
in a way that does not involve cheating. Second, we wished to ask
participants to rate the kinds of wrongs they believed were being
committed. When people criminalize the conduct of an executive
trading in the stock of his own company, are they doing so because
they feel it is unfair to other investors, because it is a breach of obligation to the company, or for some other reason?
We therefore employed four variants of our traditional merger
scenario. For each variant, we asked a more extensive series of questions than in the previous studies. First, we asked the participants to
rate the extent to which the actor in the scenario was wronging the
acquiring company, the acquired company, and other investors.
Based on the blameworthiness ratings in the previous studies, we had
reason to believe that participants thought that some party was being
wronged, but we did not know which party. We then asked about the
extent to which the actor had an unfair advantage, was breaching a
duty to the acquiring company, or was breaching a duty to the acquired company. Most theories of insider trading turn on breach of
duty, and we thought it would be interesting to see whether lay participants drew distinctions in this area. Finally, we asked about the
not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade executive: blameworthiness t = 4.21, p < 0.001;
punishment severity t = 3.76, p < 0.001; preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 94) =
10.01, p < .001. Family tipper compared to family tippee: blameworthiness t = 1.84, p
= 0.07; punishment severity t = 1.08, ns.; preferred treatment method 2 (1, N = 95) =
1.16, ns.
101. See GREEN, supra note 80.
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extent to which the actor was causing harm. All of these questions
were answered on seven-point scales ranging from one (Not at all) to
seven (Very much). We took three of the scenarios from previous
studies: the CEOs of both the acquired and acquiring companies and
the ballgame case. For each of these, we specified in the question
whether the actor had a relationship to the company in question.
We also added a novel case in which an investment analyst with no
connection to either firm was able to predict the merger using sophisticated and expensive computer software. This case allows us to assess how participants feel about actors who acquire substantial and
quasi-exclusive informational advantages, but do so within the generally accepted rules.

1.

Study 3 Method

We recruited 132 subjects for this study, once more drawing our
pool from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Data from six individuals were discarded due to an abnormally fast completion time
(less than half the median) or incorrectly answering a question intended to screen inattentive participants. Of the remaining 126 participants (forty-four male, eighty-two female), the median age was
thirty-seven. Of the participants, 41% had college degrees.
The procedure for this study varied slightly from those of the previous two. Given the expanded list of dependent measures for each
scenario, it was necessary to present each one in isolation. The small
number of scenarios allowed for use of a Latin square ordering system, and four orders were created, allowing each scenario to be presented first in one instance. These orders were contrasted in analysis
and no differences emerged.
As in Study 2, the criminalization question included a civil punishment option.

2.

Study 3 Results

Table 3 shows that the broad patterns of the blameworthiness,
criminality, and punishment severity measures on the three repeated
scenarios were the same as in Study 2: the ballgame case was seen as
distinct from the two executive cases, which in turn did not differ.102

102. ANOVA statistics for this comparison are presented in the table. On the categorical criminality data, the person overhearing at the ballgame was treated more
leniently than the executive of the acquiring company, 2 (1, N = 120) = 73.80, p < 001,
or the executive of the acquired company, 2 (1, N = 121) = 72.63, p < 001.
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The savvy investor scenario was seen as less deserving of punishment
than even the ballgame case, with the overwhelming majority of participants stating that the investor’s conduct should be permissible.103
The novel dependent measures were interesting for the differences
they did not show. Across scenarios, these measures tracked the
blameworthiness and punishment severity measures. The two CEO
cases, attracting the highest blameworthiness ratings, were also rated
as wronging the other investors and the shareholders of each company to the greatest extent, being the most unfair, violating the most obligations, and causing the most harm. Interesting for our purposes,
however, was the lack of distinction between these measures. If one
party was seen as being wronged, all three parties were. If an obligation to one company was breached, the obligation to the other company was also breached. If obligations were breached, conduct was
viewed as unfair, and vice versa.104 In fact, the only noticeable variation from this pattern involved the two CEOs. The acts of the CEO of
the acquiring company were judged more wrongful and blameworthy
than the acts of the other CEO. This difference is small, however,
and may not be meaningful.
One might have expected that the CEO of the acquiring company
would be seen as having, and therefore breaching, a duty to his own
company, but not to the other company, and likewise for the CEO of
the acquired company. Also, the person overhearing details of the
merger at a ballgame might be expected to have a duty to the acquiring company because he heard the information from that company’s
employees, but not to the acquired company. Instead we find a near
complete lack of discrimination. The traders are either doing something that is morally permissible (the savvy investor), morally grey
(the ballgame), or morally wrong (the CEOs). Distinguishing who
was being wronged, and how, was apparently less possible or less important in the minds of our participants. This result is not necessarily
surprising. People often have substantial difficulty reporting the ra-

103. ANOVA statistics for this comparison are presented in the table. On the categorical criminality data, the savvy investor was treated more leniently than the executive of the acquiring company, 2 (1, N = 121) = 89.06, p < 001, the executive of the
acquired company, 2 (1, N = 122) = 86.43, p < 001, or the person overhearing at the
ballgame 2 (1, N = 122) = 16.33, p < 001.
104. The correlations between all of the dependent measures were quite high, with
all of the novel measures correlating at least .50 with each of the three primary outcomes.
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tionales for intuitive judgments.105 In fact, it is arguably more common for people to form moral judgments based on intuitive feelings
and only later create rules to justify their decisions than to have rules
and form judgments based on their application.106 It is possible that,
in this case, participants were well aware of the conclusion they
wished to draw—that some of the conduct described was cheating
and that that was wrong—and simply chose every explanation supporting that result.

105. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 232 (1977).
106. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001).
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CONCLUSION
Our findings suggest a high degree of correlation, across several
domains, between lay attitudes concerning insider trading and current
law and practice.
In the view of our subjects, merely trading on the basis of an informational advantage not held by other traders does not make such
trading blameworthy or deserving of punishment. For example, when
a trader relied on non-confidential information obtained through his
own research and skill, our subjects judged his conduct to be without
blame, even if the information was not generally available to the public. Our subjects were only a bit more critical of the trader’s behavior
when he relied on (confidential) information obtained through
chance (as when the information was overheard at a ball game or discovered in the back of a taxi). It was only when the trader obtained
the confidential information in some presumably illicit manner, such
as by appropriating it from his employer or client, that our subjects
regarded it as clearly worthy of prohibition and censure.
Lay views also tracked current law and practice with respect to a
number of narrower doctrinal and practice issues. For example, our
subjects agreed with current practice at the SEC and DOJ that only
insider trading resulting in a large amount of ill-gotten gains should
result in criminal sanctions, while those trades resulting in comparatively small gains should be treated civilly. On the issue of tipper and
tippee liability, the views of the lay public were also mostly congruent
with current law. For example, if the tipper had selfish motives in giving information to a tippee, subjects deemed his conduct blameworthy. But if his motives were altruistic, the subjects did not blame him.
There is also another area in which we found a striking congruence
between lay views and the law. As noted at the outset, courts, regulators, and commentators, while largely condemning insider trading,
have struggled to define exactly who is wronged or harmed by such
conduct, and have struggled to determine whether the answer to that
question varies from case to case. In any given case, is the victim of
insider trading the trader on the other end of the transaction? Is it
the trading public at large? Is it the employer or other principal from
whom confidential information is misappropriated? Although our
subjects seemed to have strong intuitions that insider trading is
wrong, they were unable to isolate the victim in one case from the victim in another. In an interesting turn, we think this result suggests
that professionals and the lay public are united in their confusion over
the rationale for prohibiting insider trading.

